Egypt is presented as occupying a consequential double position: it helped organize radical Islamist forces that later became a source of violence, and it became one of the earliest targets of those forces. The book traces that connection from the anti-Soviet mobilization of the 1980s through the assassination of Anwar Sadat and Egypt’s later demands that action against terrorist networks be supported by evidence and conducted within an international legal framework.

Role in the Islamist mobilization

Egypt is named among the countries that helped organize, arm, or train radical Islamist forces assembled for the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The account stresses that the resulting networks were not simply Afghan: many of the fighters called “Afghans” came from elsewhere, and the organization of the forces involved the United States, Egypt, France, and Pakistan. Egypt’s participation thus forms part of the book’s argument that later violence cannot be understood apart from the earlier sponsorship and assembly of these groups.

Anwar Sadat’s place in this history is especially striking. He had played a major role in bringing the forces together for the anti-Soviet struggle, yet in 1981 elements drawing on those same groups assassinated him. The episode is presented as an early reversal in the history of the network: a political force fostered for one conflict turned against a leader associated with its creation.

A continuing target

The book describes Egypt as among the principal targets of the radical Islamist network after Sadat’s assassination. It identifies the Egyptian government, alongside Saudi Arabia’s, as a central object of the network’s opposition: Osama bin Laden and his supporters sought to overthrow governments they regarded as non-Islamic in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other states across the Middle East and North Africa. This account distinguishes the network’s stated political aims from the consequences of its actions, which the author says harmed poor and oppressed people in the region.

The violence was not confined to political confrontation with governments. In 1997, militants killed sixty tourists in Egypt, a mass killing that dealt a severe blow to the country’s tourism industry. The episode gives a concrete measure of the consequences for Egypt beyond the state’s conflict with the network: an attack on visitors also damaged a major local economic activity.

Evidence, law, and counterterrorism

After the September 11 attacks, Egypt is described as willing to join the United States in fighting the networks that attacked it. The author calls the country’s position ambiguous: Egypt had been important in organizing radical Islamist forces, Egyptians had become early victims of the resulting violence, and the country remained a major target. Its readiness to act, however, was presented as conditional. Egyptian officials wanted evidence identifying those implicated and insisted that action proceed under the United Nations Charter and the authority of the United Nations Security Council.

That position supports the book’s broader contrast between evidence-based legal action and retaliation. Egypt is placed among governments in the Middle East and North Africa seeking to cooperate against terrorist networks while insisting on at least minimal respect for international law. The account does not treat willingness to fight as a substitute for establishing responsibility; it emphasizes the demand to identify perpetrators before action is taken.

Place in the book’s wider argument

Egypt’s history connects two lines of the book’s argument: the political consequences of organizing armed forces for strategic purposes, and the unequal application of the label “terrorism.” In the author’s account, the forces assembled for the war in Afghanistan later operated across several regions, turned against governments including Egypt, and committed violence that also harmed civilians and local economies. Egypt’s changing position—from participant in the forces’ formation to a target seeking evidence-based action—makes that sequence particularly clear.

The account also places Egypt within a wider critique of counterterrorism policy. It argues that the same states that helped organize militant networks later faced their violence, while the response to terrorism should be distinguished from an open-ended escalation of force. Egypt’s insistence on evidence and a United Nations framework is therefore more than a diplomatic detail: it exemplifies the lawful alternative the book sets against cycles of retaliation.